The changes that the world has undergone over the past two decades have created a dramatically altered global order which requires a new understanding of the role of traditional settlements in the reconstruction of history. Using a model which is based on recognizing the historic inevitability of dominant relationships between the so-called First and Third Worlds, the paper proposes four historic phases relevant to the study of traditional settlements: the insular period, the colonial period, the era of independence and nation-building, and the present era of globalization. Four accompanying settlement forms — the indigenous vernacular, the hybrid, the modern or pseudo-modern, and the postmodern — are identified and linked to these historic periods. The paper examines the evolution of the concept of national identity and its use in understanding the changes that traditional settlements have undergone. It suggests that the condition of hybridity introduced during the colonial period have reconfigured indigenous forms. It also suggests that the influences of modernity accompanying nation-building and independence movements have resulted in the reinvention of various traditions. It concludes that in the era of globalization the forms of settlements are likely to reflect rising levels of awareness of the ethnic, racial and religious associations of the communities within which they exist.
The problem of identity in an era of globalization has major repercussions on the study of traditional dwellings and settlements. Researchers operating in the new global milieu must now often consider not only the historical and regional specificity of a culture, but also the effects of its former colonization and the conditions of its later emergence as a nation-state. Furthermore, the connection between the identity of a people and the form and culture of its dwellings and settlements may include considerations of family, ethnicity, religion, language and history. All these factors have been identified as identity-constituting elements which are handed down in a process normally referred to as “tradition.” This being the case, tradition becomes one of the paramount definers of identity. Nevertheless, the designation “traditional” continues to evoke contradictory feelings: on one hand the quality and value of authenticity, on the other the oppressive limitations of history and precedent. Tradition, properly conceived, is based on a valuing of constraint, and in a technological world of limitless choices, conflicts between the traditional and the modern in settlement form are unavoidable.

Despite these considerations, as much research has demonstrated, the traditional/modern dialectic is very problematic. Dichotomies such as East vs. West, North vs. South, First World vs. Third World, core vs. periphery, and developed vs. developing nations may be considered artificial categories. It is important to notice that the dominant term in each (West, North, core, etc.) is mainly defined in difference — that is, constructed in opposition to the other — and has no prior status as an independent real subject. Likewise, the subordinate term (East, South, periphery, etc.) is also an invention, produced in a variety of post-colonial and anti-colonial discourses. The only purpose of these dualities, then, lies in their ability to force scholars to articulate theoretical positions beyond the realm of binary opposition, and in the process reveal the complex dimensions of what is being categorized. In the present case, this may be said to concern the underlying political bases of settlement form.

In studying the relationship between the dichotomous worlds described above, and the effect of this duality on the identity of people and their settlements, I would venture to introduce a simple model constituted of four historic phases: the insular period, the colonial period, the era of independence and nation- or state-building, and the present era of globalization.

INSULAR CONDITIONS AND INDIGENOUS RESPONSES

In phase one, in much of what is referred to as the developing world, traditional communities lived in insular settings, often associated with preindustrial conditions. Although some form of economic exchange occurred between them and the larger world, curiosity about the “other” was limited. During this stage the forms of settlements may be described as evolving in reaction to the surrounding natural environment or the immediate social structure.

The badgers, or windscoops, of Hyderabad in the Indian subcontinent stand as an excellent witness to such a condition. An aerial view of the city indicates how a singular concept related to climate control could be principally responsible for a highly distinctive settlement form and skyline (FIG. 1). Made of stretched fabric on a thin board on a wooden frame, the badger channels wind down to the lower parts of a dwelling. Hyderabad took on its particular image primarily because the wind there normally blows from one direction. As a result, the windscoops are permanently fixed in that direction, giving all houses a three-dimensional antenna-like orientation.

Pit houses, or sunken (troglodyte) dwellings, used in situations of arid climates, provide another good example of the derivation of form in this insular condition. In southeastern China, for example, people escaped from the hot, arid climate by moving underground. The dark squares in the flat landscape of Tungkuan, Hunan Province, are pits about one-eighth of an acre in size and 30-50 feet deep. Around the pits are apartments which open up for light and air into what is

FIG. 1. The windscoops of Hyderabad. (Courtesy of the U.C.B. Architecture Slide Library.)
in essence a central courtyard. From the top one can only see small trees placed carefully above each staircase that leads downward. The tree acts as the official sign of the house, so you don’t describe your house to visitors or give a house number but tell them about your tree. “Even though there is no house in sight,” writes George Cressy, “one may still see smoke curling up from the field. Such does double duty with dwelling below and fields upstairs.”

Pit houses may also be found in North Africa, fifteen thousand miles from Hunan. In Metmata, southern Tunisia, for example, pit houses were excavated from dry sandstone and contained tunnelled living, working, and storage spaces (FIG.2). Such well-insulated houses were formed of longitudinal vaults that face out onto rectangular courtyards with cisterns beneath for collecting rainwater.

However, in the insular period, environmental conditions were not the only determinants that affected local settlement form. Social codes and cultural practices were also highly important. For example, in the Muslim societies of the Middle East and North Africa the dominance of cultural values such the demands of privacy generated a different form of the courtyard house, sometimes with two entirely separate circulation systems — one for use by men and another for use by women. Indeed, the interior courtyard was often considered the exclusive domain of women, while the street was the domain of men. Whether one accepts such cultural practices or not, one must recognize that the environments created around them reflected the immediate needs of a local population.

The form of settlements during this first insular phase thus appear to be shaped by both immediate social context and response to natural conditions. As such, they would also seem to reflect, at an indirect level, the identity of their inhabitants.

THE COLONIAL DIVIDE AND HYBRIDITY

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the world witnessed the rise of modern industrial capitalism and the emergence of organized political dominance represented by colonialism. Within this colonial paradigm, the world became divided into two kinds of people and two types of societies: powerful, administratively advanced, racially Caucasian, nominally Christian, and principally European dominant nations; and powerless, organizationally backward, traditionally rooted, and mainly nonwhite dominated societies. The paradigm shift from the traditional to the colonial created, in this second phase, a relationship of unequal cultural and socioeconomic exchange. Accordingly, the attempt to analyze the issues of identity in the traditional settlements of the developing world must begin with an understanding of the processes by which identity was violated, ignored, distorted, or stereotyped at this time.

The 1888 painting “The Snake Charmer” by Jean-Leon Gerôme provides a good example of these attitudes. It depicts in a beautiful, but clearly unrepresentative way, a scene in which a nude boy entertains a bunch of Arab bums in the portico of the Blue Mosque in Cairo (FIG.3). The problem of representation is critical here because such artistic creations contributed to the making of the “other” and to the enlargement of the gulf between the dominant and the dominated. The political intentions behind such an artistic production and potential reading by viewers cannot be ignored. Indeed, this realization led Edward Said to use the painting on the cover of his seminal book Orientalism.

The importance of such images was that once the backwardness of such traditional, colonized populations could be established and represented to the great mass of people in a colonial home country, it became legitimate for colonial administrators to go about reforming it. Colonial regimes attempted to
sniff out all semblance of ethnicity among colonized cultures. And when they failed to put down such aspects of culture by force, they resorted to the psychological technique of hypnotizing the native middle class. A good example of such a tactic was the Gao House sculpture in New Delhi, which represents a white settler subjugating the Buddha. Such processes of colonial domination did not spare the fabric of traditional settlements, as colonists introduced new dwelling forms almost everywhere they went.

These forces had an impact on the overall planning model for urban development in countries of both the core and the periphery. It was during this period, for example, that a sketch by Le Corbusier could show how ideas that originated in Paris were applied most demonstrably in Algiers before extending farther south to French Black Africa (FIG. 4). Considering such a pattern of influence, it was hardly surprising that, when the Algerians launched their liberation war in the fifties, the French response included the age-old "weapon" of the imposition of new urban forms. Thousands of traditional villages were destroyed so that the Algerian population could be regrouped in checkerboard resettlement towns under the banner of modernization. Such an uprooting was clearly not meant to improve conditions for the local population. It was meant to break the subversive influence of the rebels.

Overall, the colonial era resulted in a hybrid condition. Certain types of architecture and urban forms emerged that, at a visual level at least, unified the lands of colonial empires. Hybrid forms often borrowed both from colonial homelands and the indigenous vernacular. Thus, the British bungalow in India was no more Indian than British, and the Dutch villa in Indonesia was no less Indonesian than Dutch.

The impact of such systematic attempts to strip away the basis of local cultural identity became evident when colonial regimes began to crumble. As the people of the dominated societies started to rebel against the colonial world order, they found little to cling to in their drive to establish their own sovereignty other than the terms of the existing order, with its baggage of physical realities and ideological constructs like the nation-state. Groups of people belonging to different religions, languages, nationalities and traditions in certain colonial regions were often faced with the task of banding together to achieve the new, supposedly more advanced stage of independent nationhood when they had little more in common than a colonial history. Nevertheless, the few commonalities were highlighted, while the differences were suppressed in pursuit of the noble goal of “freedom.” Thus, a national identity, based on short-term political interest and the ideology of struggle, emerged as the driving force behind most nationalistic movements. Once independence was achieved, however, the glue that bound together the various groups was no longer as pervasive. Indeed, the events of the late eighties and early nineties, in places like the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are a testament to the more deep-rooted associations of people. In the post-colonial world, ethnic origin, race, and religion are emerging as the prime definers of collective identity.9

**NATIONHOOD AND THE INFLUENCES OF MODERNITY**

The demise of the European colonial empires did not necessarily change the conditions of urbanism in the developing world, nor did it reduce the complexity within the traditional settlements of those societies. During the era of colonialism, important and irreversible decisions had been made that affected the production of the built environment. In the Arab Middle East, for example, new building codes had been introduced based on Western norms. Among other things, these required building setbacks from the street that forced the traditional courtyard house out of existence. This age-old form was replaced by banal single-family dwelling units that were
unsuitable from a climatic point of view (FIGS.5, 6). Because of a host of cultural complexities, the residents of traditional quarters often preferred the modern type, even if it required bizarre adaptation. For example, in Saudi Arabia, a society that cherished privacy, residents built free-standing walls often as much as forty feet high to shield themselves from their neighbors.

Even in colonially untouched Yemen, people were often asked by modernist-influenced administrators to vacate their elegant vernacular towers. Despite the fact that such distinctive structures were much admired by the West, some of the country’s newly urbanizing population was rehoused in standardized, detached single-story dwellings built with Chinese aid. Likewise, in Turkey, a country that had not been politically colonized but which had been affected by cultural domination, the introduction of modernity was facilitated by a code system. “Modern” building codes often prohibited the use of wood, an indigenous material in some regions, and specified that it be replaced by concrete blocks.

The settlement system during this third period of development was, at some level, grossly out of balance, with the result that the physical environment became rapidly kitschized or pseudo-modernized. In places such as Cairo, traditional minarets were forced to compete on the skyline with the hulking forms of high-rise apartment and office towers.

But traditional building practices did not disappear. In some respects, they simply took different forms. For example, when I observed a light pole popping out of an apartment building in Al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, I was very surprised (FIG.7). At first I assumed it was some type of new postmodern architecture. But I later found out (and as the work of Jamel Akbar confirmed) that such infringements on public property were common. They were evidence that even within a pseudo-modern urban fabric, people continued to insist on a more traditional fluid relationship with the public realm. In the case of the light pole, out of disrespect for the law on the one hand and fear of the authorities on the other, the building owner elected to resolve the conflict by incorporating the public utility element into his private property without interfering with its function.

The origin of much of the dilemma during this post-colonial phase was an obsession with modernity on the part of most

FIG. 5. (TOP RIGHT) The traditional courtyard house settlements of Arabia.
FIG. 6. (MIDDLE RIGHT) A settlement of detached single-family dwelling units resulting from the new codes which require setbacks.
FIG. 7. (BOTTOM RIGHT) A public utility light pole integrated into a house during construction. (Courtesy of Jamel Akbar. Crises in the Built Environment.)
new governments in the developing world. This meant that the Western pattern of urban development continued to serve as the reference model for the indigenous population, particularly for the urban middle class which ran the bureaucracies of these countries in the immediate post-colonial era.

During this time, the construction of public housing was seen as an instrument for achieving social justice in many parts of the Western world. Such an approach was eventually shown to be problematic, as demonstrated clearly by the demise of projects such as Pruitt-Igoe in the U.S. The influences of modernism were so strong in the developing world that the Western model for public housing was often copied without alteration. Governments found furthermore that they could use the Western model as a means of buying the allegiance of their population, and convincing them of the new governmental order. In short, the Western model of public housing was used as an instrument of nation-building.

Thus, at the same time that Pruitt-Igoe was being torn down in St. Louis, many projects were just being completed on the outskirts of cities such as Riyadh, Tehran and Casablanca. For whom were these projects constructed? The answer may be: for people clinging to certain building traditions while their government yearned to join the so-called “modern” world.

It is ironic that such housing did, in the end, come to serve the needs of the people in some places, through processes of reappropriation that ignored original design assumptions. In Egypt, for example, thousands of public housing blocks were built under the Socialist-Nationalist regime of Nasser. These buildings suffered from all the usual deficiencies, such as their inability to accommodate the life-styles of newly urbanized residents, their lack of maintenance, their empty and unused common spaces, and their inability to adapt to the needs of expanding families. But in Egypt many residents simply took matters into their own hands. Thus, one person would decide to add a room to his apartment at ground level. And once this was built, the person above would have a balcony which he might later also enclose (FIG. 8).

The government’s response would have normally been to send a bulldozer to remove such infringements on public property. But residents have been quite resourceful. For example, in one situation they erected a mosque on the only place from which a bulldozer could come (FIG. 9). And while the government would not hesitate to demolish residential infringements, in an increasingly fundamentalist atmosphere it lacked the courage to demolish a mosque. When residents in some housing projects recognized they could wield such power, they shifted strategy. Now they would start by collecting money from each other and erect the mosque first, before beginning their additions behind its protective shield. The extent of such activities have in certain instances made it impossible to recognize the original public housing blocks (FIG. 10). Anyone looking at these settlements cannot fail to
recognize that their final forms are quite similar to the
topology of the urban informal sector, whose roots can
easily be traced to certain rural dwelling types in Egypt.

A further insight offered by this example is that it demonstrates
the power of religion as a counterforce to the ideology of
modernity. Religion, along with ethnicity and race, are clearly
becoming increasingly important as forms of community iden­tifi­cation in both the developed and the developing worlds. In
an ironic twist, this example also illustrates the emergence of a
new vernacular on the ruins of a modern prototype frequently
employed in the nation-building enterprise.

ARCHITECTS AND THE REINVENTION OF TRADITION

The world now seems to have arrived at a fourth phase in the
relationship between dominant and the dominated societies.
In the present era the search for, and reconstruction of, identity
has become paramount. But now that the dust of independence
struggles has settled, problems of national and community
harmony have surfaced. Where these issues have not been
resolved, religious and political fundamentalism have
flourished.

To understand the impact of these forces on traditional settle­
ments, one must pay closer attention to the difficulties associ­
ated with defining national identity. The constituent elements
of national identity — race, language, religion, history, terri­
toriality and tradition — have always played essential but unequal
roles. Thus, the political movements that formed the post-
World War II nations of the developing world did not represent
homogeneous entities with a common culture. In fact, these
nation-states were mainly put together by international deals
which displayed little interest in the will of the people who
actually inhabited these lands.

But even before independence was achieved there were those
who understood the importance of the emerging identity in
architecture and urbanism. Certain architects and planners in
the developing world rejected the modernist model and the
direct copying of Western forms. But, while they called for a
new authentic regionalism, they ignored the reality that the
Western model continued to shape their cities through inher­
ted institutions and regulations. The more radical elements
of this group embarked on an architectural course based
primarily on an imagined history and an invented tradition.

Architect Hassan Fathy of Egypt was prominent among
advocates of this approach. His New Gourna village, built in
the early 1950s, was intended to resettle a population whose
major occupation was dealing in buried ancient Egyptian
relics (FIG. 11). For this ideal village, Fathy designed elaborate
mud-brick structures from what he imagined to be the
indigenous traditions of the local population. In the process,
however, he introduced vaults and domes to a region that
associated such forms with the tombs and shrines of the dead.
He also resorted to borrowing the geometries and proportions
of Islamic styles which had flourished in Cairo several centur­
ies earlier but were uncommon in upper Egypt (FIG. 12).

Fathy's romanticized rendering of typical rural houses was an
elegant depiction of an idea. But his attempt to create a new
community with no real economic base and no social services
was bound to crumble, as it did. In reality, his true concern
was with form, and the reality of form for its own sake can
ever live up to the idea.

Fathy is now considered by many as the guru to architects in
the Third World. But by offering this appraisal of New
Gourna I wish to draw attention to the fact that the Fathy
phenomenon is something of a Western invention (FIG. 13).
For example, by electing to publish most of his work in English
and French and not Arabic, Fathy showed that he was
primarily concerned with establishing himself among his First World peers and not among his Third World colleagues. Like its theater, Fathy’s village was meant primarily not for its residents, but as a showpiece for other — predominantly Western — architects.

Despite Fathy’s failure in this project, his influence has been positive, since it has forced the architectural community to confront the issue of how to represent the identity of a people in its architecture. Today, the Egyptian landscape is littered with examples of Fathy-like architecture. The important question such work poses is this: if it acquires popular approval, can this invented tradition be considered a legitimate expression of Egyptian identity in the age of postmodernity?

There have been architects elsewhere in the developing world who have successfully confronted this question. For example, in India, Charles Correa has used the traditional cluster concept and typology, but has added new colors and details to create his successful Belapure Project in New Bombay. And in Iran, Kerman Diba’s design for New Shushtar has reflected the changing concerns of Iranian society for privacy and flexibility while still creating a form rooted in traditional imagery (FIG. 14).

National identity as perceived by governments, however, is inherently tied to the image that a government wishes to project at the international level. In Immanuel Wallerstein’s view, through its monopoly of policies and resources the state can create a national culture over time, even if no such culture can be said to exist in the first place. But can one design national identity? Can national identity be designed by a foreign power? Such questions confronted many of the politicians who came to power in the newly independent states of the post-colonial world. Architecturally speaking, they also confronted the architects and planners who worked for them.

The Danish architect Jorn Utzon has claimed that his Parliament building for Kuwait, made of concrete, evokes in its roof form the traditional Bedouin tent, and that its plan is based on the Islamic bazaar. Yet can the construction of such a building, even if it does possess relevant form, create an institution like democracy? The American architect Louis Khan’s Assembly in Dacca, a work of high drama, can be said to engage in a similar exercise (FIG. 15). Some have argued that its form may have been more appropriate in another country with closer links to the Roman classicist models that inspired it. Nevertheless, this building has become a symbol of Bangladesh, even though much of its inspiration was not derived from Bangladesh. This opens an interesting avenue of speculation. As Lawrence Vale has observed: “At what point, one may ask, did the pyramid become an Egyptian form? Like the pyramids of Giza or the Eiffel tower, the Citadel of Assembly may someday be seen as being quintessentially of its country as well.”

Similarly, in Egypt, the use of the pyramid form to represent the monument to the Unknown Soldier and the tomb of the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was a successful modern capitalization on a historical form (FIG. 16). This was done through a simple cross-like plan with four walls rising to meet at a point, thus replicating the image of a pyramid and capturing a pyramidal void, under which lies the tomb in the shape of a black granite cube. The monument, which was designed and built to commemorate the fallen soldiers of the October 6, 1973, Yom Kippur War, sits across the road from the military parade grounds which witnessed the assassination of Sadat on the same day in 1981. In need of an instant memorial, the government, with the approval of Sadat’s family, decided to bury him at the center of this symbolic monument, which has very different global and local meanings. Sadat was always despised by his fundamentalist foes.
(and assassins) for having attempted to revive Egypt's pharaonic past at the expense of what they considered its Arab heritage and Muslim identity. In a twist of irony, he was now being buried under a pyramid, the most globally recognized Egyptian form. However, at the local level, the inadvertent use of this form was a case in point for the larger Egyptian public, reminding them of the claim fundamentalists have long made that Sadat was the last of Egypt's modern pharaohs.

Whether real or constructed, identity cannot be based on some myth from pre-colonial times. As solace against a perceived colonial dominator, some nations and their planners have attempted to build a new identity around an imagined past. But as Gwendolyn Wright has noted, "the past cannot simply mean a retreat to a golden age before modern industrialization." Respect for the past in the developing world must include accepting and coming to terms with the legacy of both colonialism and nationalism.

If one accepts, as Louis Snyder has repeatedly argued, that national identity is a social construct tied to temporal events, then it follows that the urbanism that accompanies it can only symbolize national identity as observed by a single individual or groups of individuals at a specific point in time. It is also important to recognize that there comes a point in the life of all formally colonized people when they must cease perceiving of their colonial history as colonial and start absorbing this heritage as their own. But when is this point reached? When did the forms of the British colonizers become the vernacular heritage of the eastern United States? When did the Spanish colonial settlement forms in many parts of Latin America emerge as the traditional architecture that has become popular in these societies today? Of course, as Eric Hobsbawm has explained, all traditions are invented. The question is when and how do they acquire popular acceptance?

PROBLEMATIZING IDENTITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

In the present world order, the problem of national identity has been further complicated by extensive economic exchange. Not only do nations now have to mediate between pre-colonial and colonial legacies, between the traditional and the modern, but they also must deal with the effects of globalization.

I refer here to globalization as the process by which the world is becoming one economic entity. It is a process characterized
by interconnected modes of production and exchange, transnational flows of labor and capital, and a predominantly capitalist world system. But since capitalism thrives on the construction of difference, such an economic universalism, under the confines of a world constituted of national units, can only lead to further cultural division. Culture has now become the globally authoritative paradigm for explaining difference and the means of locating the "other."[20]

Within this context, the considerable migration from the former colonies to the lands of the former colonizers and the infiltration of ethnic subcultures into mainstream First World Western societies cannot be dismissed. In fact, this phenomena has been the cause of many social conflicts, as local subcultures resort to ethnic, racial or religious allegiances to defend their identity from absorption into the dominant majority culture. The current struggles of multiculturalism and gender politics in the U.S. may be a good example of an ideology that attempts to embrace difference as a fundamental constituent of national identity. In this regard it is ironic that while the national identity of the former colonizers is undergoing major change — often becoming more inclusive — the national identity of the former colonized nations is moving in the opposite direction — often becoming more exclusive and more directly linked to national origin or religious association. Indeed, the twentieth century has witnessed the return of states where belonging to a particular religion or ethnic identity is a prerequisite for nationality. [21] But national identity is always in a process of transformation and flux, and the forces of globalization continue to challenge the concept of a single "world culture."

The complexity of this global era is perhaps best evident in the controversy over Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. [22] Rushdie, a naturalized British citizen of Muslim-Indian origin, wrote the novel employing anachronies and using real names derived from the historical development of Islam. Although the book was hailed in the West on the basis of its artistic and linguistic merit, it did not sit well with millions of Muslims in places like India, Pakistan and Iran. The result was the infamous death sentence imposed against Rushdie by the Iranian clergy. Events such as the Rushdie affair bring home "how globalized and yet unglobalized culture has become." [23] Had Rushdie written his book before the compression of time and space by communication technology, it would have caused few ripples. But today distance and language have ceased to be the buffers they once were, and this allowed the story to reach an unintended audience who reacted negatively to it from within the context of their own beliefs and values.

Another example of the same processes can be seen in the recent publicity given to a monument constructed by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (FIG.17). The so-called "Victory Arch" in Baghdad consists of two colossal swords, modeled on Hussein’s own arms, crossed over a major thoroughfare. The base of this structure is made of reinforced concrete and contains hundreds of the bullet-punctured helmets of Iranian soldiers from the Iran-Iraq War of the late 1980s. [24] Does this monument really represent the wholesale breakdown of society’s ability to judge right from wrong, as Western critics have asserted? Or does it simply represent a form of monumental kitsch, the roots of which lie in the common political symbolism of the region. In interpreting this monument, Westerners seem to have accorded themselves the right to judge without the duty to understand. For example, the very same symbol used by Saddam Hussein can be found in the official insignia of Saudi Arabia, a country which has been a strong ally of the West. How is its expression as a representation of moral values different in one application than in another?

In cultural conflicts like these, meanings are often lost in cyberspace. The problem may be particularly acute in relation to understanding the effects of a single "world system" on settlement forms. Here, I would venture to suggest that each person harbors two conflicting sentiments toward culture and tradition. One tendency is to resort to culture and tradition out of fear of change — change that in and of itself may be unavoidable. Such protectionism against the unknown inevitably turns into isolationist forms of fundamentalism. The second sentiment is characterized by interest in the culture of the mysterious "other." It emerges from a totally different feeling — the desire to have the choice to merge with the "other" and share in a wider, or different, collective consciousness. The tremendous movement of citizens across borders and the rise of protected ethnic enclaves demonstrate that both sentiments are active today and are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, they may occur simultaneously.

For those interested in the study of traditional settlements in a global era, there are a few lessons to be learned from this complex condition. First, one may argue that even if there is a "world culture," it is a culture of dominant groups, marked by the control of diversity rather than the generalization of uniformity. The second lesson involves the connection between such a world culture and space, for a world culture can only be placeless, created through the increasing interconnectedness of local and national communities without clear home territories. Manuel Castells has pointed to the rise of the "space of flows in opposition to the space of places," where organizations are connected by flows of information whose logic is largely uncontrolled by any specific local society, but whose impact is likely to shape the lives of all local societies. [25] Although identity may never be placeless, the impact on
settlement form is that cultural experience may in the end become less place-rooted and more informationally-based.

Despite the globalization trends, world history has demonstrated a movement towards cultural differentiation, not homogenization. Today each individual belongs increasingly to many cultures, and may boast multiple cultural identities. In this sense identity is continually under construction, undergoing a process of constant evolution. If such hybridity is seen as an inherent constituent of national identity, ensuing settlement form can never be more than the reflection of a transitional stage in the life of that society. Indeed, globalization has made issues of identity and representation in dwelling and settlement form very cumbersome. It has challenged the very possibility of any physical form to represent the identity of a people, a nation, or a culture.

In the new global era, the people of traditional settlements in most parts of the world have now become more aware of, and dependent on, their religious, ethnic and racial roots. New forms that represent these sub-identities will likely emerge. Only time will tell whether these forms will be marginalized or become part of the never-ending cycle of innovation and transmission we call "tradition."
This paper was delivered as a keynote presentation at the "Value in Tradition," Tunis, December 17-20, 1994. It is published here in its original form, taking into account reviewers' comments. A different and more developed version of this research, concentrating on aspects of housing and globalization, was also delivered as an invited talk at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, D.C. The center may publish it in book form at a later date. The author wishes to acknowledge the center's support in this development, and also to thank scholars and reviewers at the center for their comments.

11. Ibid.
15. I. Wallerstein, "The National and the Universal: Can there be such a thing as a World Culture?" in King, ed., *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*.
20. Robertson, "Social Theory, Cultural Relativity."