Field Report


YISHI LIU

Rural Korean-Chinese dwelling traditions have undergone deep social and political fluctuations since the arrival of Korean migrants in Yanbian in the late nineteenth century. However, the way this population has built their houses has continued to reinforce their sense of a separate identity in a foreign land. By examining ethnic policies related to Korean-Chinese rural houses in Yanbian, this study affirms the role of the state in constructing ethnic identity, and challenges the present theorization of hybridity.

Oriented toward China’s frontier and adjacent to North Korea and Russia, Yanbian Korean Chinese Autonomous Prefecture is the largest administrative entity in Jilin province. Subdivided into six municipalities, it is home to an estimated 806,000 ethnic Koreans (FIG. 1).¹

Large numbers of Koreans originally migrated to this area in the late nineteenth century during a period of famine on the Korean peninsula. Thus, although Yanbian was officially designated an autonomous prefecture in 1952, its status as a formal administrative region can be traced to the foreign and frontier policies of the late Qing dynasty. Indeed, legitimization of the residency of Korean immigrants in Yanbian in 1881 marked a crucial moment in the development of the agricultural potential of Manchuria. Since then, however, Korean Chinese in Yanbian have experienced profound social and economic changes under a series of political regimes with very different ethnic policies.

The Korean minority in Yanbian is culturally distinct from other groups in China. Unlike many other minorities in China, ethnic Koreans were also incorporated into the
Chinese state as the result of voluntary migration, not territorial expansion. However, since their arrival in northeast China, at a time of rising consciousness of the nation-state, Korean Chinese have been keen to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness — although there have been different reasons for this over the years.

This report examines three issues: Chinese ethnic (and frontier) policies in Yanbian during the last hundred years; the way ethnic Korean identity has been (re)constructed in China; and changes in Chinese-Korean house form in Yanbian. Specifically, I argue that policies of the Chinese government have been instrumental in (re)constructing Korean-Chinese identity. To illustrate this, I connect the material development of the rural Korean-Chinese house to changing ethnic and frontier policies, placing it within the rubric of ethnic identity, modernity and globality. In terms of ethnic policies and identity (re)formation, contrary to recent postcolonial and transnational studies, the report also affirms the strong role played by the Chinese state.

I cut into these issues from the perspective of the form and interior arrangement of Korean-Chinese houses. These residences, and the environment in which they have been built, are not just composed of physical and spatial forms; they are evidence of an attitude of mind. By comparing the plans of houses on the Korean peninsula to those in Yanbian, I show how the Korean-Chinese house, as a hybrid form, has changed over time and now differs in many respects from either its Korean or Chinese counterparts. More importantly, I explain how before the Communist revolution, the hybrid rural Korean-Chinese house was a site of resistance to harsh attempts to assimilate migrant Koreans to Chinese culture. Yet even under more favorable Communist ethnic policies, the practice of hybridity has continued, and today it resists not state authority, but another powerful homogenizing force — globalization. This report thus tells how both sinicization and globalization have failed to assimilate and eliminate a separate sense of Korean-Chinese identity in Yanbian.

In order to discern how different ethnic policies have affected material culture, a long historical lens, covering several political regimes, is required. The report thus refers to primary and secondary sources on Chinese ethnic policies of different time periods, and incorporates the analysis of selected ethnic-Korean rural houses from my fieldwork. However, in addition to the rhetoric and intentions of central- and local-government policies, I look at the various social realities those policies have created during the last century — a period of political and economic turmoil. This involves examining such factors as family structure, the specification and use of rooms for different domestic activities, the availability of household consumer goods, and the apportioning of domestic space.

The report focuses on rural houses, because in traditional contexts, as Amos Rapoport noted, “designers were either the users themselves, or designers and clients typically shared the same culture.” In the case of Yanbian, these designers and clients have been local Korean-Chinese peasants. Furthermore, as an ethnic minority, immigrant Koreans have remained outside the workings of the Chinese state. Thus, the way they have built their houses reveals the repercussions of local resistance, confrontation and negotiation during the implementation of state policies.

To better understand how such political considerations have affected the construction of rural houses in Yanbian, it is important to understand the history of Korean migration to Manchuria. It is to this that I turn first.

FORMATION OF KOREAN-CHINESE COMMUNITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF A HOUSE PROTOTYPE

Throughout history, the close interaction between China and Korea has resulted in population movements between the two countries. Written records exist of Korean migration to northeast China long before the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911). During most of their rule, however, the Qing emperors, who originated in Manchuria, restricted all other ethnic groups from entering their homeland in an effort to preserve it as a base separate from Han Chinese life and culture.

Koreans, however, kept crossing the border to Yanbian to cultivate wet rice. This activity led to their expulsion on several occasions during the early and high Qing dynasty. Indeed, until the 1880s it was considered illegal by both governments for Koreans to cross the border to Yanbian as
either farmers or harvesters of ginseng. Those farmers who did visit Yanbian in the summer were therefore temporary sojourners, and they avoided building permanent structures in fear that these would be destroyed by local officials.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, increasing Russian (and, after the 1890s, Japanese) aggression in Manchuria changed the population dynamic in Yanbian. To counter this outside threat, the Manchus modified their exclusion policy, and began recruiting Chinese from other provinces, such as Shandong and Hebei, to cultivate land in this sparsely populated border region. Yanbian was also opened to settlement by both Han Chinese from the hinterland and immigrant Koreans. However, Han Chinese were initially reluctant to move to the area because of its remoteness and primitive transportation system. As a result, in the next few decades, they were quickly outnumbered by Koreans.

Legalization of residency in 1881 meant that Koreans could build permanent structures on newly acquired lands in Yanbian. The settlers also began to form immigrant villages, normally composed of no more than twenty households who shared a common surname. Despite harsh Qing policies enforcing ethnic assimilation, by 1900 there were already more than three hundred such voluntary villages, and Korean-Chinese communities had become firmly established in Manchuria. The migration of Koreans to Yanbian in the late nineteenth century also brought new architectural ideas and construction techniques to the area. To understand their importance, however, requires a brief discussion of the traditional Korean dwelling.

Scholars have argued that fengshui and Confucianism together established the underlying rules for the design of traditional Korean houses, creating distinct patterns of sitting and spatial organization that reflected distinct patterns of domestic life. There were two basic house forms. Houses of the well-to-do were generally made of adobe brick, with an interior courtyard surrounded by colonnades and open rooms. A strong hierarchy of privacy, both visually and mentally, was enhanced by the use of thresholds, gates, screens and walls, which marked boundaries between outside and inside, and between male and female sectors. Also, unlike the simple intersections of four sloping surfaces common in northern Chinese houses, a vertical plane was normally inserted at both ends of the massive hipped roofs (tiled in grey or dark blue), creating a distinct architectural feature. The second house type was a more unassuming rural one. Its walls were made of mud with a plaster surface, and its roof was covered with mud and thick thatch. Humble dwellings of this sort did not include a formal courtyard. They also did not include a strict partition between genders, although a hierarchy of privacy could still be discerned.

It is important to note that Koreans customarily take off their shoes when entering a room. Furthermore, in traditional Korean dwellings, colonnaded porches with deep eaves played a crucial role in movement from one room to another. Often such houses did not feature openings between rooms, and all doors opened directly to the exterior colonnade.

Above all, the most striking feature of Korean houses was a flat, heatable bed, built with bricks or thin stone slabs, the surface of which was often covered with wooden boards or fiberboard decorated with a yellow lacquer polish. Called an ondol, this was a common answer among people of the region to the need for warmth during the cold, damp winters. And because it provided the main location for everyday activities in the traditional Korean house (such as eating, playing, lounging and entertaining), it defined the interior layout. Moreover, because domestic Korean activities normally took place while sitting on the ondol, Korean dwellings appear lower than their Chinese counterparts, in which chair-sitting prevailed.

Both the tile- and thatched-roofed house types arrived in Yanbian with Korean farmers beginning in the 1880s, making the single-story dwellings of these early settlers quite distinct from those of the local Chinese. Unlike the Chinese houses, spaces in the migrants’ houses were divided by light, sliding wooden screens that could be opened and closed according to need. It was hard to distinguish windows and doors from outside the Korean-Chinese house — quite unimaginable in the Chinese house. Latticed door panels allowed summertime ventilation in Korean-Chinese dwellings. And Korean-Chinese houses did not conform to the strict stipulation for bilateral symmetry and a central bay in a Chinese house.

Ethnic-Korean houses in Yanbian also put great emphasis on the gudul (the term Korean-Chinese used to describe the equivalent of the ondol). Han Chinese or Manchu houses of the region also featured a heated bed, known as a kang. But in Korean-style dwellings this area was much bigger, and it was connected to a larger stove. Furthermore, in a Manchu house the kang was typically U-shaped, designed to honor the west wall, allow a place for a shrine, and leave space in the center of the room for movement. And in a Han house, it was normally I- or L-shaped — leaving room for furniture such as chairs and tables and indicating the equal importance of activities on and off it. By contrast, the Korean-Chinese gudul was a place of everyday life. In essence, it served as a multipurpose room, and most activities took place on it, as might be expected of a “floor-sitting” instead of “chair-sitting” culture (fig. 2).

Korean-Chinese houses also differed in terms of kitchen layout from Han or Manchu houses. In Manchu and Han houses, kitchens were built on one side of the central bay, facing the entrance. They were also separated from the kang and other rooms by partition walls. Korean-Chinese kitchens, on the other hand, were located next to the wide gudul. And where Han and Manchu kitchens were generally built at ground level, those in Korean-Chinese houses were built slightly lower. Finally, since a gudul was larger than similar structures in northeastern Chinese house traditions,
Korean-Chinese houses had one more (three in total) fire hole (FIG. 3). Multiple flues were embedded under the floor and fed directly by fires in the kitchen stove, generating sufficient heat to enable the enlarged size of the gudul and making an insulating partition between the gudul room and the kitchen unnecessary (FIG. 4). The proximity of the kitchen and living room (gudul) also provided ample opportunity for men and women to talk during cooking, an important aspect of the Korean way of life.

Faced with the repressive ethnocentric policies of the Qing dynasty, immigrant Koreans responded by organizing themselves into various kinds of associations. These helped promote education and the use of the Korean language as a way to keep their ethnic identity and autonomy alive. In addition, Korean immigrants, who moved to Yanbian due to famine at home, grouped themselves into compact “spontaneous” villages.

In their new land, Koreans were forced to change many of their customs, including their hair and clothing styles. But they successfully maintained their dwelling form and domestic lifestyle (which were out of sight of mistrustful magistrates). As the local government was, until recently, neither able to provide economic aid to Koreans nor willing to regulate their building practices, for many decades Korean immigrants continued to build their houses according to practices familiar to them from their past lives on the Korean peninsula.

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND ETHNIC POLICIES: PROCESS OF CHANGE

Koreans who migrated to Yanbian in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century consciously maintained their cultural difference and ethnic characteristics. Scholars now agree that notions of ethnic identity are not formed as a natural byproduct of descent, culture and genetic transmission; rather, research has focused on its socially constructed aspects — i.e., the ways in which boundaries, identities and cultures are negotiated, defined and transformed through interaction both inside and outside an ethnic community. The (re)construction of a minority ethnic identity, such as that of migrant Koreans in Yanbian, can thus be understood as a continuous process that not only involves socio-cultural self-definition, but also the impact of external forces.

Of these external forces, labeling by the state and by other ethnic groups can be very important. There are several ways that ethnicity can thus be “politically constructed,” i.e., ways in
which ethnic boundaries, identities and cultures may be negotiated, defined and produced by political interaction. Recent studies of borderlands have revealed how this negotiation may challenge the conventional political notions of late modernity. This has been particularly true in Southeast Asia where state sovereignty in border regions is sometimes marginal, and may even be abandoned. However, in this report I argue that the nation-state has remained the dominant force regulating and shaping the ethnic boundaries of Korean-Chinese people and influencing their patterns of ethnic identification.

As a group, ethnic Koreans in Yanbian have generally been poor rice farmers, who have remained outsiders to state power. As such, they have been greatly affected by Chinese ethnic and frontier policies. These can be roughly periodized into five phases: the harsh assimilating policies of the late Qing dynasty (1881–1911); overt hostility during the Nationalist and warlord governments (1912–1931); conceptual separation from Chinese during Japanese rule in Manchuria (1931–1945); improved status as a model minority during the early years of Maoism, but ethnic backlash during the Cultural Revolution (1948–1977); and the recent reform policies associated first with the opening of China to the outside by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and including new internal aid programs since 2001 that have supported the development of ethnic border regions. As I will show, under Communist ideology, the designation of Korean Chinese as members of the “peasant” class has been crucial in bringing psychological change to their identity. However, reaction to their harsh treatment during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) has also been a significant motivator.

During the last years of the Qing dynasty and the succeeding years of Nationalist and warlord regimes, Koreans moved to Yanbian in increasing numbers, either to flee Japanese rule or economic hardship or to use China as a base for anti-Japanese resistance. Yet even as these immigrant Koreans played a crucial role in developing the agricultural resources of Yanbian and contributed to Chinese frontier policies, local officials remained suspicious of them. In a report to Beijing in 1907, a Chinese official expressed anxiety over the great number of Korean immigrants:

Koreans who moved here should obey the regulations of our country, and get rid of their old customs. [However] local officials failed to carry out the decree of enforcing them to cut hair and change dressing, as a result, Korean immigrants sojourning here look alien from our culture. . . . Koreans in Yanbian amounted to more than 50,000, while Chinese were only one fourth of that number. The region now almost becomes a Korean colony.

In fact, the Qing rulers never loosened their ethnic assimilation policies, even after 1881. Naturalization and forced adoption of Chinese clothing and hair styles were prerequisites for owning a piece of land (ti fa ru ji, “changing hair style to be naturalized”). Furthermore, in 1910, one year before Qing rule ended, “Specifications of Naturalization of Immigrant Koreans” were issued to segregate Koreans from Chinese and further regulate their activities. These rules were explicitly seen as a way “to convert the temperament of Korean people, make them true Chinese, and eventually realize ethnic assimilation.” Despite all these restrictions, however, Koreans came to own 55 percent of the cultivated land in Yanbian by 1929.

The mistrust between local Chinese and immigrant Koreans grew when Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and decreed that all ethnic Koreans would thereafter be granted Japanese citizenship. This caused the Chinese Nationalist government to fear increasing Japanese encroachment and a conspiracy between ethnic Koreans and Japanese to occupy land in Manchuria. This led the Nationalist government to intensify ethnic assimilation policies directed at Koreans, and even to expel a few Koreans from Yanbian. When the Japanese did finally occupy Manchuria in 1931, as Japanese subjects, Koreans were accorded higher status than Han Chinese; nevertheless, in an attempt to eliminate their ethnic identity, they were prohibited from using the Korean language.

Chinese Communists gained from the power struggle in Yanbian during the Japanese occupation. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) earned the backing of many Koreans by promoting a policy of ethnic equality and helping liberate Koreans from both Japanese colonial rule and the ethnocentric policies of the Chinese Nationalists. Korean Chinese later played an important role in building the new socialist state by fighting effectively against Japan and the Nationalists. The considerable contribution of Korean immigrants to the development of northeast China was also acknowledged, while the unpleasant memory of collaboration with the Japanese was generally obliterated from official propaganda. Indeed, under early Communist rule, ethnic Koreans were depicted as a model minority, closely “associating with” the central government. And, within the Communist ideology, the status of ethnic Koreans as “peasants” accorded them favorable treatment as members of a reliable social class.

For the older generation, who had experienced considerable hardship since coming to China, the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a blessing, because the Communists promised to give poor peasants land of their own. Most older Koreans accepted China as their own country with gratitude and sincerity. Furthermore, the Communist government’s ethnic policies guaranteed respect for minority traditions and customs, education in their own language, and regional political autonomy. Korean Chinese thus came to associate themselves psychologically with northeastern China, regarding themselves as Chinese nationals. In general, they regarded themselves not only as beneficiaries of a new, “enlightened” Chinese minority policy, but also of Communist rule.
The Korean-Chinese house did not change much with the coming of the PRC in 1949. As was the case in northern areas of the Korean peninsula, rural houses were still roofed largely with mud and thatch, a condition well documented in the 1950s and 1960s in Manchuria. And though Korean-Chinese villages were collectivized under Communist rule and government control was for the first time able to penetrate to very low levels, few official efforts were made to improve local housing conditions. This lack of attention may have been the result of Communist modernization policies, which gave priority to industrial construction in cities; it also accorded with policies before the reform era that praised production and denounced consumption. Preferring to live in ethnic villages as “cultural islands,” Korean Chinese were thus able to maintain their traditions, retaining such activities as ethnic songs and folk dances, which were encouraged by Communist policies. Throughout Mao’s regime, the closed nature of Chinese society, which allowed no freedom of residence or movement, also helped Koreans preserve their ethnic boundaries and solidify their community. During this period, houses also continued to be built as they had been in previous decades.

Despite their loyalty to the CCP, Koreans were nevertheless among the ethnic groups in the northeast who suffered most during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Many Korean leaders and intellectuals were falsely charged with spying or with being regional nationalists. Korean-Chinese people learned from this experience that they were still somehow different from mainstream Chinese. And with the beginning of the reform period, this created a passion to construct a new sense of ethnic identity. The policies of the Cultural Revolution damaged the standing of Korean Chinese considerably. It was not until the promulgation of the 1984 “Law on the Autonomy of Regional Nationalities” that new government policies establishing respect for customs and that the use of Korean language in education were restored. However, economic development was the primary focus of government attention during the early years of the reform era. As Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of Chinese reform, who visited Yanbian in 1983, explained: “[i]f we do not do well in economy, ethnic autonomy is but an empty slogan.”

The birth rate is quite low in this region, despite the government’s encouragement. In many cases, whole families have been able to go to Seoul as immigrant workers. Such rapid social mobility has, however, created disorder within family structures, as young people have left behind villages in the border region. Nowadays, Korean-Chinese communities in Yanbian are also undergoing a second wave of transformation as more and more young women are being attracted to cities, leaving single young men stranded in small villages. The birth rate is quite low in this region, despite the government’s encouragement. In many cases, whole families have moved, and houses have been left deserted.

In China, Koreans have also been able to protect their particular identity by preserving their language, keeping their ethnic traditions, and attending ethnic schools (which have been promoted by Communist minority policies). As a result, many young Korean Chinese are bilingual, and can find jobs in trading industries in big cities like Beijing and Qingdao, or they have been able to go to Seoul as immigrant workers.

Moreover, as is the case elsewhere in the country, not all change during the reform era has had to do with economic development. The elevation of the status of women in society and in the family is now a prominent aspect of ethnic policy. A steady transition has also taken place away from traditional multigenerational families to the nuclear family, and conjugality has replaced parenthood as the focus of domestic life. These changes were intensified by the household contract responsibility system, a milestone of reform policy instituted in 1978. In the 1990s, a survey of a village in Helong County of Yanbian showed that there were 36 nuclear households out of a total of 58 Korean families, accounting for 62.1 percent of all families.

These changes to family structure have significantly altered domestic living patterns. The downsizing of the Korean-Chinese family, in particular, is now being clearly expressed in the remaking of house form and spatial arrangements. One obvious trend is toward separate dwellings to house and be the property of separate nuclear families. The decreasing number of family members in a household has also made it possible to combine small rooms into larger ones. Historically, bedrooms in Korean-Chinese houses were small, and partitions were used to allow a multigenerational family to live under the same roof. By comparison, a nuclear family today demands more space, but fewer partitions. These changes were clearly evident in my fieldwork. For instance, a gudul room in a house built in the 1970s in Lutian Village in Hunchun has been enlarged through the removal of partitions between it and the adjacent bedrooms. Modern furniture and electronic facilities have also been brought into the house. Such material change attests to the impact of ethnic policies on house form.

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So far, I have examined the major role played by the state in the (re)construction of ethnic Korean identity in China.
From the imperial Qing to the PRC era, the portrayal of ethnic Koreans in official propaganda has changed from descriptions of a suspicious, if not vicious, minority group, to praise for Koreans as hardworking, reliable citizens. As shown in the next section, this (re)definition has in turn affected the self-definition and culture of Chinese Koreans. But this discussion first requires a recap of several points related to the construction of culture, the forces that shape and influence the contents of ethnicity, and the purposes of ethnic meanings. As Rapoport has suggested, one needs to “dismantle” the concept of culture to classify and clarify the component parts.  

**FIGURE 5.** Combination of internal space due to the change in family structure in Korean-Chinese communities. Enlargement of storage (top left), of bedroom (top right), and of gudul-living room (right). Original plan courtesy of Lin Jinhua, Yanbian University.

**FIGURE 6.** An enlarged gudul room in a Korean-Chinese house, built in the 1970s in Lutian Village. Note the Western-style furniture and modern electric devices.

**FIGURE 7.** An abandoned house in Lutian Village. The whole family went to Seoul as immigrant workers, an epitome of present economic changes that are causing the decay of old structures in Korean-Chinese villages.

**THE KOREAN-CHINESE HOUSE: A HYBRID FORM**

Because Yanbian is oriented to a geographical border (“a region where two different civilizations face each other and overlap”), interethnic interaction and everyday accommodation based on face-to-face relationships there was inevitable. Though ethnic Koreans retained their housing traditions as a way to maintain their identity, these had to be adjusted to new geographical and cultural surroundings. In other words, once ethnic Koreans settled down in Yanbian, they created a new, hybrid housing type that might be termed Korean-Chinese “overlap” architecture.

One of the most disputed terms in postcolonial studies, “hybridity” commonly refers to “the creation of new transcul-
tural forms within the contact zone produced by colonization." Nezar AlSayyad has written that hybridity can be understood as a condition of interaction between parties with concretely differing positions of power, who must nevertheless cohabit. Emerging from a space where elements encounter and transform each other, instead of simply being a synthesis of components, hybrid culture has the potential to be a site of resistance, where the colonial subject hybridizes, and the dominant power fails.

In the case of ethnic Korean houses in Yanbian, it is important to examine the nature of this hybrid form and its changing meanings and intentions over time. A hybrid house form did serve to resist the policies of assimilation under the Qing dynasty and colonization during the Japanese occupation. However, contrary to the present theorization, I argue that hybridity cannot always be seen as counterhegemonic or resistant to the policies of the state. Indeed, in this case the understanding of hybridity is inseparable from the self-perception by Korean-Chinese and from Chinese ethnic policies that encouraged them to voluntarily isolate themselves from others and manage their lives in small villages.

Exchange between Manchu, Han, and Korean-Chinese cultures has had a significant influence on housing in Yanbian, and it has resulted in the development of more sophisticated forms. As an immigrant ethnic group, it was inevitable that Koreans would be influenced by, and in turn influence, surrounding groups. In a continuous process of interaction with Han Chinese and others, the form of the dwelling and its elements, and finally ethnic identity itself, have evolved so they are no longer the same as those of Koreans on the peninsula.

The Korean-Chinese rural house can be called a hybrid form for several reasons. First, its plan underwent a number of modifications upon arrival in Manchuria. As the accompanying drawings indicate, the plans of Korean-Chinese rural houses display a number of variations from historic Korean prototypes (figs. 8, 9). The kitchen was further compartmentalized, and more space was allotted for the cowshed and for storage because immigrant Koreans cultivated large areas of rice. Bedrooms were further partitioned, the additional complexity of arrangement suggesting an increased number of household members. The external chimney was also a visual marker of Korean dwellings. Yet, unlike traditional Korean houses, Korean-Chinese chimneys were built as diminutive towers constructed with a brick base and a square wooden or adobe pipe, and they were placed beyond an endwall instead of in the center of the building (fig. 10). Chimneys typically also protruded well above the ridgeline to lessen the possibility of igniting the thatched roof — a common feature of Manchu houses that can be dated to prehistoric times.

Second, the way of everyday life changed subtly in the early years after the Korean migration to Yanbian. On the peninsula, the horizontality of a Korean-style rural dwelling was often accentuated by a colonnaded facade that sheltered an elevated wooden porch, providing a transitional space between outside and inside. Raised some 40 centimeters above the foundation stones, this was a functional space where household members and visitors could remove their shoes before entering and sitting directly on the gudul. In response to the harsh winters in Manchuria, however, Korean Chinese began to take their shoes off inside the

**Figure 8.** Plans of the prototypes of folk houses in the north of the Korean peninsula, surveyed by Yoshiyuki Iwatsuki in 1924. Source: Shiro Sasaki, “Research Trends Geographical Studies on Korean Housing,” Collection of International Studies at Utsunomiya University, No.12 (2006).

**Figure 9.** The typical plan of Korean-Chinese houses in Yanbian, surveyed in 1953. Note the variations and modifications from Figure 8. Redrawn by author from Y. Zhang, Jilin min ju (Vernacular House in Jilin) (Beijing: Beijing Architectural Industry Press, 1985).
As a result, the external porch became more decorative than functional, and has now disappeared entirely in many recently built and rebuilt houses.

In Changcai Village of Longjing City, one of the six municipalities of Yanbian Prefecture, there are approximately one hundred households, with a total population of 323 people, all of whom are Korean Chinese. This village was one of the earliest established by immigrant Koreans, who moved there from Hamgyöngdo in the 1880s. During fieldwork here, I found that Korean-Chinese houses came to display many variations from the prototypical Korean folk houses described in 1924 by Yoshiyuki Iwatsuki (refer to fig. 8). In the case of both tiled- and thatched-roof houses, the colonnaded porch has either been reduced in size or eliminated. Tiled-roofs houses originally featured a full external colonnaded porch, but the gudul room and kitchen were later extended to include this area as interior space (fig. 11). In thatched-roof houses the colonnaded porch has been entirely merged into the gudul room, indicating that both family members and visitors now remove their shoes inside the house (fig. 12). Moreover, in villages where Koreans and Chinese live together, L-shaped and even I-shaped kang may sometimes now be used for pragmatic reasons. Korean-Chinese people have thus changed their lifestyle from that on the Korean peninsula to accommodate natural and cultural circumstance in Yanbian. Variations in house plan are a testament to this social and cultural change.

Although many modifications were made to produce a hybrid form, a large gudul has always dominated the interior spatial arrangement of Korean-Chinese houses. This has meant that the typical symmetry and hierarchy of layout in a Han Chinese house never became a reference for ethnic Korean houses. In the royal record of the Korean Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), the ondol was described as a way to prevent illness. And in Korean domestic architecture subfloor heating has long been regarded not merely as an element of

**Figure 10.** A Korean-Chinese chimney (Lutian Village) is built as a diminutive tower with a square vertical pipe, and is placed beyond the endwall of the house.

**Figure 11.** The Li residence in Changcai Village, built in the 1910s. Note the external colonnaded porch has shrunk in size and is unconnected to the gudul room.

**Figure 12.** The Gao residence in Lutian Village, built in 1905. Note the external colonnaded porch is totally merged with the gudul room. Plan courtesy of Ms. Lin Jinhua at Yanbian University.
house design, but as a key infrastructure of culture and healthcare. Thus, when Koreans moved to Yanbian to cultivate rice, it is not hard to understand why they retained this system as a way to endure the long, severe winter.

In the Korean-Chinese house, the gudul is an arena where everyday activities and interactions take place. As a container for culture and a cultural mechanism, it supports traditional, familiar activities, food habits, and so on — i.e., expressions of the cultural core important to Korean Chinese as a group. No matter how the external circumstances changed, the gudul remained the dominant interior feature of the Korean-Chinese house. It provided comprehensible cues for behavior and fit people’s unwritten rules and lifestyles. As a core cultural element, the gudul helped reinforce and redefine group identity.

Under the ethnocratic policies of the Qing dynasty, house form was one of the few choices Korean Chinese could effectively make to mark their ethnic identity in a foreign land. Almost everything in a house that reflected their lifestyle — height, size, decoration, number of bays, principles of spatial arrangement — were used to demonstrate closeness to the culture of the Korean peninsula and a different sense of nationality. And in continuing to build houses around the gudul, lifestyle became a form of resistance, part of an effort by which Korean Chinese could construct an ethnic identity that distinguished them from others. As such, house form became a realm of resistance to the coercive ethnic assimilation policies of the Qing dynasty and the oppressive regimes that followed.

Homi Bhabha has argued that resistance does not require “intentionality,” and thus should not be defined by an oppositional politics. Instead, resistance is “the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate the signs of cultural difference and reimplicate them within the deferential relations of colonial power — hierarchy, normalization, marginalization, and so forth.” Resistance, as exemplified in the making of the ethnic-Korean rural house, was not triggered by the ambition to gain political autonomy for the region. It merely indicated that the homogenizing politics of “colonizing disavowal” failed in domestic life. Thereby, the binary categories such as cultural domination and political hegemony were both dismantled, allowing a means of developing new anti-monolithic models of cultural exchange and growth.

If the original hydridity of the Korean-Chinese house represented a form of resistance, the practice of (re)making it after the Communist revolution likewise has not accorded with the official evaluation of ethnic Koreans as an obedient minority. However, in order to study the nature of hybridity in the Korean-Chinese house under the new ethnic policies of the PRC, the ethnic policies themselves deserve close examination.

The PRC is defined in its constitution as a “unitary multiethnic state,” consisting of people from many nationalities. Its original ethnic policy thus guaranteed respect for such things as the traditions and customs of minorities, ethnic education in minority languages, and political participation through national regional autonomy. However, as I mentioned at the end of the last section, the ethnic policy of the PRC drew a distinction between ethnic identity and political identity. This distinction fit the needs of the Korean minority in China well. Under Maoist ideology, ethnic and cultural differences were replaced by class divisions, allowing ethnic Koreans to consider themselves Chinese nationals of Korean origin. The strong ethnic identity of a minority was actually presumed to help intensify its Chinese political identity. (The issue of how to construct ethnic identity did not surface until the end of Cultural Revolution.) This self-definition of Korean-Chinese people as part of, rather than apart from, the Chinese state is deeply rooted. In a 2004 report, more than 70 percent of young Korean Chinese indicated that they thought of themselves as Chinese by citizenship, Korean by culture.

In this vein, keeping Korean-Chinese traditions and culture has become a crucial part of state ethnic policies, which in turn has encouraged the elevation of ethnic consciousness. Thus, since the beginning of the reform era, the government has felt it imperative to subsidize ethnic minorities to enhance their cultural identity. Indeed, present ethnic policies actually encourage strong cultural identity among minorities as a way to promote ethnic unity and stability in the border region. The hybrid form developed in (re)making the ethnic Korean house since then has thus become a state-supported practice.

Profound material change has taken place in ethnic-Korean rural houses since the reform era began, and since China has become increasingly integrated into the world economy. Material change has in turn brought change in the way of life, a crucial aspect of ethnic identity. If hybridity has come to resist anything during this new period, it is another “homogenizing, unifying force” — globalization. In this case, hybridization works to counter the normalizing and homogenizing aspects of globalization, even as globalization enhances certain aspects of local culture in material terms.

Since reform, Korean Chinese peasants have found that they can afford larger houses, more expensive materials, and modern electronic devices. Other changes, such as the removal of cowshed from the main house and the use of glazed windows, have changed the exterior appearance of the traditional house altogether (fig. 13). Meanwhile, inside, modern, Western equipment such as a refrigerator, natural-gas stove, and water-purifying devices are now widely used. These changes can be seen in another house I surveyed during my fieldwork. Built in the late 1990s in Lutian village, its large gudul room is now equipped with Western-style wardrobes and electric appliances (fig. 14).

Language and education have been two of the most important elements that have increased the willingness of the Korean minority to accept outside influence. And in sev-
eral respects house form and interior arrangement now reflect a standardized notion of modern life. Perhaps most significantly, recent developments in spatial layout reflect a growing concern for health and hygiene. This helps explain the removal of the cowshed. In the aforementioned provincial survey of the 1950s, the cowshed was an integral part of the layout of a Korean-Chinese house. However, it subsequently came to be thought of as “unhealthy,” and was removed from the house permanently.

Domestic space is now divided into separate and distinct, specialized rooms to accommodate different domestic activities and functions (cooking, eating, sleeping, bathing, relaxation), but more specifically to accommodate the accumulation of consumer goods. These have been made available through the mass market, and imported from the outside industrialized world. They include such items as Western-style furniture, specialized equipment, a variety of clothes, cooking utensils, and the general accoutrements of living.

However, long-standing aspects of the Korean way of life have not simply given way. The kitchen, for instance, was where young people were taught about formality, informality and neatness and how to behave properly when watching food being prepared. In new affordable housing built in 2007, a thin partition with glass is used to separate the kitchen and the main gudul room. The new materials keep the cooking space from intruding on living space, without blocking visual exchange, allowing the old lifestyle to be maintained while enhancing sanitary conditions (fig. 15).

In the houses in this newly built community, the gudul also continues to occupy the largest area and govern the overall layout of interior space. In many ways the prominence of the gudul has been reinforced, even though partitions have been added to separate it from the kitchen. The gudul is an element of the culture core that maintains group identity. As such, its position has not been lost as a result of exposure to economic globalization, which has otherwise brought a new dynamic to rural Korean-Chinese houses.

The idea of globalization cannot be properly understood out of the context of local particularities. Though some authors have written that globalization implies processes of mass cultural homogenization, many scholars have argued that cultural globalization should be recognized as involving diverse phenomena originating in different nations and regions. The material development in Korean-Chinese houses can be considered a testament to the latter view. In this case, the process of Yanbian’s integration into the global economy has redefined and reinforced a group identity. The success of South Korea’s modernization is regarded as a model for economic development in China, and the cultural influence of the South on Korean communities in China, especially among young people, is extensive. Cultural commodities from South Korea are particularly favored by Korean Chinese. For instance, faddish posters showing popular Korean movie stars are popularly used as wall decorations in Yanbian. Though standardized in many aspects, the forces of globalization thus are able to reinforce local identity in a context such as this.

The condition of the Korean-Chinese house is also today being influenced by a new Chinese government initiative to improve rural living conditions. Issues related to farmers, agriculture, and rural areas have become a major concern of the central government in the new millennium, and it enacted a policy of “Constructing Socialist New Rural
“Communities” in 2005, whose aim has been to narrow the gap between urban and rural China. For the first time this new law has called for the improvement of rural infrastructure and included clear stipulations for planning and (re)building rural housing. The policy is now being implemented on a national level, from villages in the outskirts of Beijing to the most remote corners of the country.

In Yanbian, the project gained full impetus in 2007. Rural houses were first classified according to standing conditions. For those requiring renovation, the policy then mandated that thatched roofs be replaced with tile, and plastered mud walls be replaced with brick and mortar. Dilapidated houses were to be demolished and rebuilt on their existing sites. As an official report admitted, in the construction of such new rural communities, “the central problem of rebuilding rural thatch-and-mud houses is that peasants generally fail to raise enough money.” However, government subsidies have now helped persuade peasants to remake their houses. In Antu County, the maximum financial subsidy to a Korean-Chinese household to renovate or rebuild a house was RMB 12,000 — a favorable term for ethnic Koreans. In Antu, it is reported that nine hundred thatched houses have been renovated in 2008, and more will be rebuilt in 2009.

Scholars interested in vernacular houses and cultures may be worried about the rapid transformation in rural Yanbian, as it seems “renovating” a Korean-Chinese thatched house actually means rebuilding it from the ground up with modern materials. The expectation is that ethnic and cultural traits will disappear under the onslaught of globalization. However, the resilience of Korean-Chinese communities in response to external circumstances should not be underestimated, especially with the active support of the state. For instance, in the newly built Korean-Chinese community in Yueqing Township of Tumen City, not only do construction materials and technologies differ from those in traditional houses, but the introduction of such elements as glazed windows, iron security doors, corbel friezes, and tiled-roofs in bright colors, have altogether altered the appearance of individual homes (Fig. 16). However, as an indication of the continuity of the traditional lifestyle, the major living room is still dominated by the gudul, even if it is built using new materials and technologies (Fig. 17).
THE NEW INSTRUMENTALITY OF HYBRID FORM

The ethnic-Korean house in Yanbian, after reform, thus provides an example in which hybridity does not resist political authority. It also raises questions about the present theorization of hybridity. What the Chinese state has done is to encourage the local government, headed by elected ethnic Koreans, to manage its cultural and economic life, while retaining power over external political affairs. Hybridity can thus be seen as a part of state ethnic policy, and it does not necessarily carry a negative political message. However, hybridity in this case does resist something — the homogenizing force of globalization — much as it resisted the assimilating policies of the late Qing dynasty. In this way hybridity retains its potential as a form of resistance to cultural domination and the politics of homogenization, and in the development of new anti-monolithic models of cultural exchange and growth.

The different political significations of hybridity in Yanbian track the impact of changing ethnic policies. Throughout this report, I have argued that ethnic policies, along with other external social and economic processes, have been crucial in shaping and reshaping ethnic categories and definitions, and that these ethnic policies were designed and implemented by the Chinese state. However, ethnicity is also the product of actions undertaken by ethnic groups as they form and reform their own self-definition and culture. In order to understand the interplay between the actions of ethnic groups and the larger social structures with which they form and reform identity, I have examined in detail the change in ethnic-Korean rural houses since the 1880s.

The design of dwellings, the materials and manner of their construction, their size and contents, and their arrangement in settlements are perhaps the most visible signs of any civilization and culture. Housing standards clearly reflect forms of civilization, the extent of economic development, lifeways, social and political priorities. In this report I have traced the trajectory of notions of Korean ethnicity in China as a reaction to state policies, from the ethnocentrism of the late Qing dynasty to the accommodation with contemporary globalization that has characterized the reform era. I have examined how ethnic policies have manifested themselves in house form, both directly — for instance, in terms of the change in family structure following changes in government policies with regard to the role of women — and indirectly, as exemplified in the different meanings and intentions of hybridity. I have proposed that the ethnic identity of a minority group is constructed in a continuous process, and that house form, defined by culture, helps reinforce and redefine that identity. For example, I have shown that the gudul in the Korean-Chinese house provides comprehensible cues for behavior and thus continues to reinforce unwritten rules and lifestyles. It has thus been retained as an architectural element through different regimes for more than one hundred years and become a defining element of group identity.

Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture is labeled by the state as a model of ethnic unity and the stability. Though present Chinese ethnic and frontier policies, which have played a key role in forming ethnic identity and shaping house form, are basically a success story in Yanbian, in other border areas, such as Tibet and Xinjiang, recent uprisings and riots have challenged these policies. It may well be that alternations and amendments to these policies will appear, and that social and political change will once again demonstrate itself in the making and remaking of physical construction.

REFERENCE NOTES

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1. This covers an area of 42,700 square kilometers, according to a provincial survey in 2002. The six municipalities are Yanji, Longjing, Helong, Tumen, Dunhua and Hunchun, and the two counties are Antu and Wangqing. For more details on the distribution of the Korean minority in China, see Zaixian Zhu, “Dui Zhongguo Chaoxianzu ren kou fen bu yu te dian ji qi fa zhan qu shi de fen xi” (“Analysis of the Distribution of the Population and Characteristics of China’s Korean Minority”), in Chaoxianzu yanjiu luncong (Research Series on the Korean Minority), Vol.5, edited
by the Research Center on Nationalities of Yanbian University (Yanjian: Yanbian University Press, 2001), pp.223–49.
4. During the early and high Qing dynasty, Koreans moved to Yanbian and built huts, which attracted the attention of both the Korean and Chinese governments. Emperors Kangxi, Qianlong, Jiaqing, and Daoguang ordered Korean huts burned and illegal Korean crosses expelled. See Qing "zheng ri han guan xi shi liao (Foreign Relations between China, Japan and Korea during the Qing Dynasty), edited by the Institute of Modern History of the Central Academy (Taipei: Institute of Modern History of Central Academy Press, 1972).
5. During its Joseon dynasty, 1392–1910, Korea was a dependent country to the Chinese Qing dynasty, until 1895 when the Qing dynasty was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese War. The peak of the Qing dynasty’s control over Korea came in 1882, in the aftermath of the appeasement of a palace revolution. The two countries had much in common culturally and politically, sharing a Confucian ideology, a bureaucratic system, etc.
6. Immigrant Koreans first came to Yanbian seasonally for economic purposes, returning to the Korean peninsula in the winter; they did not form permanent villages until the 1890s. See Chunshan Jin, Yanbian di qu chaoxianzu su he hui de xing cheng yan jiu (A Study of Korean Communities in Yanbian) (Changchun: Changchun Zhengtai Press, 2001), chapter 2, “Formation of Korean village in late Qing.” pp.59–97.
7. Koreans at that time used thin wood rods to support the walls, and covered roofs with thatch. See Hunchun fu du tong ya men dang an xuan bian II (Selected Archives of Hunchun Vicem Commissioner-in-Chief) (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1991), pp.322–33.
9. Fengshui is a traditional art and philosophy which deals with the formation of landscape and its evaluation, as well as with the selection of sites for settlement. Fengshui originated in China and was introduced to Korean peninsula. For more information on how fengshui defines the siting of a Korean village, see Sang-Hae Lee, “Siting and General Organization of Traditional Korean Settlements,” in J. Bourdier and N. AlSayad, eds., Dwellings, Settlements and Tradition: Cross-Cultural Tradition (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).
10. Some scholars, including Koreans, write the word also as gudul. Ondol, a word of Chinese origin, denotes a system, while gudul (a pure Korean word) denotes a material (stone). My thanks to Prof. Song Sang-yong for raising this point.
11. The associations included private schools for young children, such as Dacheng Middle School. See Shoushan Qian, “chaoxianzu feng su lei xing ji qi feng bu qu yu” (“Distribution of Korean-Chinese Customs”), China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies, Vol.36 No.2 (2000).
12. Until 1931, the compact villages established by immigrant Koreans were basically spontaneous — that is, they were formed by land-hungry peasants under a common surname who moved to Yanbian voluntarily. However, after 1931, when the Japanese extended their rule to the whole of Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo, Korean farmers were forced to migrate north to China by the Japanese government as part of a project of military colonization. At this time, Koreans were grouped together in designated sites, which I call “enforced villages.” It is obvious the two types of villages developed under different sets of conditions, and in this report I will mainly focus on the development of houses in spontaneous villages formed before 1931.
13. By this time Koreans had already been molded into a “nation” in the modern sense.
18. In 1910, resident ethnic Koreans in Yanbian totaled 202,070. In 1915, the number rose to 282,070. It had reached 459,427 in the year 1920, and 607,119 in the year of 1930. From Jin, A Study of Korean Communities in Yanbian, Table 4-1, p.169.
19. Quote from Wu Luzhen’s “Yanji bian wu hao gao” (“Frontier Affairs in Yanji”) to the central government. See Jin, A Study of Korean Communities in Yanbian, chapter 2, “Formation of Korean Village in Late Qing,” p.93.

20. Later on, in fear that the Japanese would use naturalized Koreans to acquire land, it also became a requirement that landowners abandon their Korean citizenship. This became of particular concern after 1910, when Korea was annexed into the Japanese Empire, and the Japanese began to proclaim concerned for all their “citizens,” including Koreans. For more detail on the duality of Korean citizenship, see Lanying Zhao, “Dongbeichaoxian yi min jing ji yu wen hua kao cha” (“A Study on Economy and Culture of Immigrant Korean Communities in Manchuria, 1840–1945”), Northeast Asia Forum, Vol.13 No.5 (2004).


23. A famous example of the heightening conflict between local Chinese and immigrant Koreans was the Wankaoshan Incident, which involved leased land near Changchun in 1931, just a few months before the 9/18 Incident that resulted in the Japanese occupying all of Manchuria. For more details on the Wankaoshan Incident, see Yu Jing, “The Beginning and Ending of Wankaoshan Incident,” in Yu Jing, History of Changchun (Changchun: Changchun Press, 2001), pp.104–77.

24. For the policies of expulsion in place in Yanbian before 1931, see Jin, A Study of Korean Communities in Yanbian, chapter 6, “Chinese Expelling Policies and Responses by Korean Communities,” pp.244–53.

25. According to Communist propaganda, the idea of class struggle was more important than that of ethnic struggle or political independence. Thus, Korean-Chinese Communists believed they suffered more from class repression than ethnic discrimination, either at the hands of the Japanese colonizers or previous Chinese regimes. The success of the Chinese socialist revolution thus meant the liberation of the Korean ethnicity from class repression.

26. For example, when the Communists took over Changchun in April 1946, a regiment composed of Korean “brothers and comrades” took the mission of the avant-garde. See “Wu Hengfu and the 4/14 Campaign,” in Changchun Cultural and Historical Materials (1988/5), pp.127–38.

27. For the official account of the history of the Korean minority in Manchuria, see Chaosianzui jianshi (Brief History of the Korean Nationality) (Yanj: Yanbian People’s Press).

28. Official reports document no serious social problems related to ethnic issues in Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture since its establishment in 1953, even during the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution. After reform, Yanbian was the first autonomous prefecture that instituted the Ordinance of Autonomous Administration, and in 1994, 1999 and 2005, Yanbian was marked by the State Department as the emblem of ethnic consolidation. See Jin Xian, “The Successful Practice of Ethnic Autonomous Policies in Yanbian,” Journal of Ethnicity in China, Vol.1 (2009).


31. In some villages, a study room, built in brick or adobe mud, became the center for the study of Communist propaganda and a meeting place for the village council. But few records of common rural houses have been found, and the officially initiated project of renovation of dilapidated thatched Korean-Chinese houses is but a very recent phenomenon. See the official website page of Antu City of Yanbian, http://www.yanbian.gov.cn/yanbian/board.php?board=xinnong_02.

32. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, many Korean leaders and intellectuals were falsely charged with spying or with being regional nationalists. The Cultural Revolution had tremendous impact on the marginalization of Korean identity in socialist China. Gil, in “The Korean Minority in China,” argued that “In the decade following 1966, minority education and Korean usage were strongly undermined. The emphasis on ethnic identification was strongly criticized as cultural degeneration and political retreat. Koreans were marginalized. This experience has remained in the collective consciousness of Koreans, who have considered themselves as marginals since their immigration.”

33. Xiaoping Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol.1 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1994), p.167. This is actually a quote from one of his speeches on Tibet in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the idea of promoting economic work has dominated ethnic policy-making since the 1980s, and this is the statement most frequently cited by high-ranking CCP officials.


41. Yoshiyuki Iwatsuki conducted systematic research and drew plan prototypes of Korean folk houses in 1924. His work is today regarded as the precursor of all Korean folk housing studies. He classified Korean folk houses into five types according to geographical divisions. See Shiro Sasaki, “Dai ni ji se kai I zen no ho bun bun hen ni mi ru kan min ka no chi ri gaku teki hen kyo no ni seki” (“Research Trends Geographical Studies on Korean Housing”), Collection of International Studies at Utsunomiya University, No.12 (2006), pp.1–12.
43. See note 41.
48. Some scholars of globalization, such as John Tomlinson in his book Cultural Imperialism, maintain that globalization of culture takes place according to integration and disintegration processes that transcend the nation-state, and that processes of cultural homogenization take place on a global scale. Other scholars argue that cultural globalization is a complex of diverse phenomena, and consists of global cultures originating from many different nations and regions. For example, see A. King, Spaces of Global Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp.30–32.
52. A few that have engaged Western audiences were the uprising in Tibet in March 2008 and the riot in Xinjiang in July 2009.

All photos are by the author.